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NORTH CAROLINA'S RETREAT FROM FAIR HOUSING:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF NORTH CAROLINA




This article concerns the necessary and proper proof in housing dis-
crimination litigation.' On November 12, 1985 I appeared before the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, in Washington, D.C., to ad-
dress the issue whether intent or effect is the proper standard of proof in
housing discrimination cases. I now extend the debate and my argument
here, as there, supports the effect standard.2 The principal coverage of
title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 prohibits discriminatory con-
duct undertaken "because of," "based on" or "on account of" race (or
some other protected status such as color, religion, national origin or
sex).3 The quoted phrases are undefined in the statute and although
some would argue that the "because of" language suggests that subjec-
tive intent is required to render conduct in violation of title VIII, the
substantial majority of federal court decisions has held that a Fair Hous-
ing Act violation can be demonstrated if the action of complaint had a
racially discriminatory effect.4
This topic is of particular interest to fair housing advocates in the state
* Associate Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University; B.A. Stanford University,
1967; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1971.
1. See generally, Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a
Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981). As Professor Kushner states: "The
most difficult concept in civil rights litigation, and housing discrimination litigation in particular, is
the question of proof: what evidence is required to prove a violation and which party carries the
burden of proof." J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION 53 (1983).
2. Calmore, Proving Housing Discrimination: Intent vs. Effect and the Continuing Search for
the Proper Touchstone, in 1 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ISSUES IN HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION 77 (1985); see also Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54
NOTRE DAME LAW. (1978).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1982).
4. See cases cited in R. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 59 n.63 (1983 & Supp.
1986). Indeed, Professor Schwemm's own view is that the federal courts of appeal "now universally
accept the proposition that Title VIII may be violated by practices with a discriminatory effect."
Letter from Robert Schwemm to the author, July 31, 1986; on file with the North Carolina Central
Law Journal.
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of North Carolina in light of the recent decision by the state court of
appeals in North Carolina Human Relations Council v. Weaver Realty
Co. 5 The court in Weaver rejected a substantial body of federal fair hous-
ing law in interpreting the 1984 state fair housing act6 to require inten-
tional discrimination7 and to require also that race constitute more than
a mere factor in a defendant's discriminatory decisions.8
This article will focus on Weaver and its implications. It will demon-
strate that the federal case law interpreting title VIII has established that
an effect standard is justified as being judicially manageable and fair to all
parties involved in housing discrimination litigation. Moreover, the
Weaver decision will be cited as having reduced the state fair housing act
to an inadequate remedy when compared to that of the federal statute.
The article concludes therefore that the Weaver decision should be over-
turned by the North Carolina Legislature.
II. NORTH CAROLINA HUMAN RELATIONS COUNCIL V WEA VER
REALTY COMPANY
On March 18, 1986, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina issued its
opinion in North Carolina Human Relations Council v. Weaver Realty
Co. The case is the first one brought under North Carolina's state fair
housing act to reach the appellate level. The state act's key provisions
are modeled after provisions of the federal Fair Housing Act, and the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
has recognized the state statute as "substantially equivalent" with respect
to the rights and remedies it provides to redress certain aspects of hous-
ing discrimination.9
As interpreted by the court in Weaver, however, the two statutes are
no longer substantially equivalent, but, rather, are in stark conflict. Even
absent evidence of racially discriminatory motive, the federal courts have
recognized a title VIII violation upon a showing that policies and prac-
tices have produced a racially discriminatory effect.10 Federal courts
also have consistently held that when title VIII violations were demon-
5. 79 N.C. App. 710, 340 S.E.2d 766 (1986).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-10 (1984).
7. The Fourth Circuit has ruled to the contrary of Weaver in both the private transaction
context and the governmental action context. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 986-
88 (4th Cir. 1984)(a prima facie case under title VIII of the federal Fair Housing Act may be estab-
lished where an all-adult housing policy had a disparate adverse impact on nonwhites); Smith v.
Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982)(a prima facie case established by town's prevention
of a low-income housing development which produced disproportionate adverse impact on
nonwhites).
8. In contrast to Weaver, see, e.g., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.
1970); Payne v. Bracher, 582 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1978).
9. See 24 C.F.R. § 115.1 (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1982); and Part III, infra.
10. R. SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 54.
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strated by citing housing policies and practices motivated by racial dis-
crimination, it has been sufficient to show that race was one motivating
factor among many."
Writing for the court in Weaver, Chief Judge Hedrick declared that if a
particular housing practice or policy is not motivated by discriminatory
considerations of race (color, religion, sex, or national origin), then there
is no violation of the state fair housing act regardless of how "disparate"
the impact of the practice or policy. 2 Moreover, the Weaver decision
legitimated partial racial discrimination by holding that racial considera-
tions must be more than merely a factor in defendant's decision to reject
a plaintiff alleging violation of the state fair housing act. 13 Thus, impor-
tant aspects of housing discrimination law were interpreted differently
under the state statute than under federal law.
The Weaver case arose when the state Human Relations Council acted
on behalf of Patty Leach, a black woman who was the single parent of
two minor children, a boy and a girl, both of whom were over six-years-
old. She claimed that the defendants refused to rent a two- or three-
bedroom apartment to her because of her race.' 4 The realty company
had two special family composition rules regarding the leasing of its two-
and three-bedroom apartments. The apartments were financed by the
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). A FmHA regulation provided
that families with fewer than four members could not rent a three-bed-
room apartment without FmHA permission. Thus, defendants claimed
they could not rent a three-bedroom apartment to plaintiff."5 The realty
company also had its own policy preventing single parents who had chil-
dren of opposite sexes, at least one of whom was over six, from qualifying
for a two-bedroom apartment.' 6 The realty company further claimed
that the family composition rules could not be waived by its resident
manager and that no exception to the family composition rules had ever
been granted to any apartment applicant regardless of race.' 7
Ms. Leach presented evidence showing both intentional discriminatory
treatment and discriminatory effect. Her supporting affidavits declared
that the resident manager admitted there was a quota on selecting blacks,
that she did everything she could to keep blacks out, and a white appli-
cant with familial and financial attributes similar to Ms. Leach testified
she was told that the resident manager would seek permission to waive
11. Id. at 58; see also Mandelker, Combatting Housing Discrimination in the 1980's, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 537, 540 (1985).
12. 79 N.C. App. at 715, 340 S.E.2d at 769.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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the family composition rules and that the rules were really a "weapon"
for keeping out undesirable blacks. Finally, Ms. Leach produced evi-
dence showing that only six percent of black applicants but sixty-four
percent of white applicants had been accepted at the apartment as of
March 30, 1984. During the same time, fifteen percent of the black ap-
plicants and ten percent of white applicants had been denied leases ex-
plicitly due to the family composition rules. 8
In spite of the conflicting evidence, Superior Court Judge James H.
Pou Baily entered summary judgment for the realty company and Ms.
Leach appealed. Although the appellate court's interpretation of the
state fair housing act was extraordinarily restrictive, it reversed and re-
manded Judge Baily's decision because Ms. Leach presented evidence
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defend-
ants discriminated against her in the leasing of an apartment because she
was black.' 9 The appellate decision held that on remand Ms. Leach
could prove discrimination by showing that the facially neutral family
composition rules were designed to discriminate against blacks, were ap-
plied in a discriminatory manner through the waiver policy, or by other-
wise showing that she could have leased the apartment if she were not
black.2"
Because of the "favorable" remand, the Human Relations Council at-
torney representing Ms. Leach has stated that the case would not be ap-
pealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.2" Thus, a case clearly
inappropriate for summary judgment and rightfully appealed has none-
theless made very bad law regarding the elimination of the fair housing
discriminatory effect claim and the imposition of a strict standard of cau-
sation requiring race to be more than a mere factor in mixed-motive
cases of intentional discrimination. Ironically, the appellate decision
should not hurt Ms. Leach who has a strong case of intentional
discrimination. 2
III. TITLE VIII AND THE NORTH CAROLINA FAIR HOUSING LAW
ARE No LONGER "SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT"
There are three separate and independent means of enforcing title
VIII: (1) a private civil action brought directly without a prior adminis-
18. Id. at 713, 340 S.E.2d at 768.
19. Id. at 715, 340 S.E.2d at 769.
20. Id. at 716, 340 S.E.2d at 769.
21. Interview with Daniel D. Addison, Attorney for the North Carolina Human Relations
Council (July 17, 1986).
22. See, e.g., Harper v. Hutton, 594 F.2d 1091, 1093 (6th Cir. 1979)(landlord's too-poor-to-rent
policy reflected an unequal application of selection criteria and served merely as a pretext for racial
discrimination: "[W]e are convinced that the defendant refused to rent to plaintiffs because they
were both poor and black. Had they been white, he would not have refused").
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trative complaint or resolution as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 3612; (2) a
civil action brought under section 3613 by the Justice Department in
"pattern or practice" and "general public importance" cases; and (3) an
administrative complaint filed with HUD as authorized by section 3610.
A direct suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 3612 is preferable in many
ways to one brought under Section 3610 in that there is less delay in
getting a judicial resolution and there is clearer availability of damages
and attorney fees (whereas Section 3610 appears to authorize injunctive
relief only). There are cases, however, where a direct suit is not the most
feasible alternative as, for instance, when a complainant lacks the neces-
sary funds to initiate and sustain litigation. As Professor Schwemm
notes, "Whatever the reason, thousands of complainants initiate Section
3610(a) proceedings with HUD every year, far more than the number
who file court suits under Section 3612.
' 23
Under 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) of the Fair Housing Act, HUD refers com-
plaints to the appropriate state or local agency wherever a state or local
fair housing law provides rights and remedies for alleged housing dis-
crimination which are "substantially equivalent" to the rights and reme-
dies provided by title VIII.24 As of April 4, 1986, HUD recognized such
laws in 34 states, including North Carolina, and 65 localities.25
In evaluating the adequacy of state or local law to meet the standard of
substantial equivalence, the HUD regulations suggest that the Weaver
decision could justifiably prompt HUD to withdraw its recognition of
North Carolina's statute. Withdrawal can be based on a consideration
not only of the law on its face, but also on, taken as a whole, the jurisdic-
23. R. SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 230-31. In short, a § 3610 administrative complaint may
offer the housing discrimination victim a "simple, inexpensive, informal conciliation procedure" that
will "provide a ... less burdensome method of resolving housing complaints." Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 104-05 (1979).
24. The regulations promulgated to implement this provision are at 24 C.F.R. §§ 115.1-.11
(1986).
25. The states are:
Alaska Maine North Carolina
California Maryland Oregon
Colorado Massachusetts Pennsylvania
Connecticut Michigan Rhode Island




Indiana New Hampshire West Virginia
Iowa New Jersey Wisconsin
Kansas New Mexico
Kentucky New York
51 Fed. Reg. 11577 (April 4, 1986). See also the listing in Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H)
4251.11 (Apr. 14, 1986). The number of complaints referred to state or local agencies increased
from 7% in 1979 to 67% in 1984. Waldrop, Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act: What Role
Should the Federal Government Play?, 74 Ky. L.J. 201, 225 (1985-86).
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tion's administration of its fair housing law.26 The North Carolina fair
housing act as interpreted in Weaver now fails to meet at least two HUD
criteria for assessing its adequacy: (1) it places excessive burdens on
complainants that might discourage filing of complaints and (2) it is no
longer sufficiently comprehensive in its prohibitions to be an effective
means of carrying out and achieving the intent and purposes of the fed-
eral act.27
Although the regulations' recognition of a state or local law is not a
determination that the judicial protection and enforcement of the law's
rights are substantially equivalent to those found in title VIII,2s interpre-
tations of the state law can be appropriate in HUD's analysis of the state
law's adequacy.29 Thus, federal-state differences regarding such issues as
standing, damages, or attorney fees probably would not jeopardize the
state law's substantial equivalence characterization. But Weaver has
eliminated a complete cause of action, that of suing for non-intentional,
discriminatory acts which nonetheless produce discriminatory effect.
Moreover, Weaver has rejected the federal standard of causation. The
substantive reach of plaintiff's or complainant's cause of action has been
greatly cutback. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept the recognition that
the North Carolina law continues to be substantially equivalent to the
federal Fair Housing Act with respect to the rights and remedies pro-
vided. The simple truth is that now many plaintiffs proceeding under
title VIII, as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit (and every other circuit),
will have no claim at all under the North Carolina law.3°
IV. MIXED MOTIVES AND CAUSATION IN INTENTIONAL
DISCRIMINATION
It is clear that the "because of race.. ." requirement is met when plain-
tiff can show that the defendant's conduct was motivated solely by race.3"
In many cases, however, motives are mixed or multiple and race is
merely one factor among several' that a defendant might consider in his
or her decision not to deal with plaintiff.32 In these instances, title VIII's
applicability turns, in part, on the standard of causation adopted: Must
race be shown to constitute the sole or decisive reason for defendant's
rejection of a prospective tenant or homebuyer or may liability attach if
26. 24 C.F.R. § 115.8 (1986).
27. Id. §§ 115.3(a)(3),(5).
28. Id. § 115.3(b); see also Denny v. Hutcheson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816, 819(10th Cir. 1981).
29. Id. § 115.3(c).
30. See sources cited supra notes 7-8.
31. See R. SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 53-54.
32. Calmore, Fair Housing and the Black Poor: An Advocacy Guide, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
609, 625-26 (1984).
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race is shown to be only one of the contributing factors?3 3 The federal
courts find a title VIII violation if race is merely one of the factors that
motivated the defendant even though the defendant may also cite valid,
non-racial excuses for plaintiff's rejection.34 As the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit aptly stated: "[R]ace is an impermissible factor in...
[defendant's] decision and... it cannot be brushed aside because it was
neither the sole reason for discrimination nor the total factor of discrimi-
nation. We find no acceptable place in the law for partial racial
discrimination.,3
5
In Weaver, Judge Hedrick characterized this standard of causation ap-
plied by federal courts in title VIII cases as "peculiar. ' 36 Claiming to
adopt the "traditional proximate cause standard" with which state courts
have extensive experience in applying, the judge declared that race, color,
religion, sex or national origin must therefore constitute "more than a
mere factor in a defendant's decision not to engage in a real estate trans-
action."' 37 While it is clear that Judge Hedrick has rejected the federal
standard, it is not clear, beyond labels, what is really being proposed in
its place.
Although the Weaver decision refers to "proximate cause," the court
seems to adopt a "but-for" cause-in-fact standard similar to the "same
decision" test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in its anal-
ysis of equal protection cases. 38 According to the Supreme Court, as-
suming that plaintiff demonstrates discriminatory purpose as among
defendant's multiple motives, violation of the equal protection clause is
not necessarily established.39 This proof, rather, shifts to the defendant
"the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted
even had the impermissible purpose not been considered."'  If the dis-
criminator meets this burden, he or she would prevail because the plain-
tiff "no longer fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper
consideration of a discriminatory purpose.'41
Relying on the Supreme Court's stricter causation standard in consti-
tutional cases to support a similar standard in fair housing cases is inap-
33. R. SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 54-55.
34. Id.
35. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970) (emphasis in
original).
36. Weaver, 79 N.C. App. at 715, 340 S.E.2d at 769.
37. Id.
38. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71
(1977)(Arlington Heights 1); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
281-87 (1977) ("same decision" test applied).
39. Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 270-71 n.21.
40. Id.
41. Id. The test is critized in Gates, The Supreme Court and the Debate over Discriminatory
Purpose and Disproprotion-Impact, 26 Loy. L. REV. 567, 613-16 (1980); Note, Developments in the
Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1678 (1978).
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propriate. The Supreme Court has recognized that a statutory standard
can be more generous and title VIII cases addressing the issue after the
1977 "same decision test" was articulated "have kept unbroken the line
of cases holding that Title VIII is violated if race plays any role in the
defendant's intent decisions."42 Indeed, in light of the legislative intent
governing the Fair Housing Act, one such case held that given any racial
motive in discriminating against plaintiff, "the presence of other factors
also motivating the refusal to rent cannot under any statutory provision
justify racial discrimination." 3 In interpreting a state fair housing law
that is supposed to be "substantially equivalent" to the rights and reme-
dies provided by the federal statute, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
has in effect translated the state law into something that contradicts the
very intent of the federal law, rendering the state law substantially less
adequate rather than equivalent.
By recognizing-indeed legitimating-partial racial discrimination,
the Weaver decision invites discriminating defendants to indulge in after-
the-fact rationalizations that will amount to no more than pretext. 44 For
example, in Lamb v. Sallee,4" the defendant attempted to justify her re-
fusal to rent to an interracial couple because they were living together,
but unmarried. Defendant, however, knew of this before she approved of
renting to the couple and only raised this point after learning that the
woman was black.46 In this case, the female plaintiff was black, but ap-
peared white. Her relatives who helped her move in were more obviously
black, however. Upon learning the identity of the blacks helping with
the move, defendant cancelled the rental agreement. Under these cir-
cumstances, the court did not believe that defendant's refusal to deal
with plaintiff was based on her unmarried status.47
Pretext has also been found when plaintiff misrepresented the length of
time he had been employed and the landlord used this as a justification
for denying him an apartment. 48 The court recognized that normally a
landlord has a right to refuse to rent to a person believed by the landlord
to be unreliable due to misrepresentation. In this case, however, the
court deemed the refusal to be based on an "afterthought" and a "depar-
ture" from the informal, rather casual manner in which defendant had
previously accepted white tenants, most of whom had been admitted on
the basis of reference from other tenants.49
42. R. SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 57.
43. Payne v. Bracher, 582 F.2d 17, 17-18 (5th Cir. 1978).
44. See Calmore, supra note 32, at 634-36.
45. 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
46. Id. at 286.
47. Id. For a consideration of after-thought pretext in the countext of governmental exclusion-
ary practice, see Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 877 (E.D. Va. 1982).
48. Hall v. Freitas, 343 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
49. Id. at 1101.
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V. THE CASE LAW OF TITLE VIII ESTABLISHES THE JUSTIFICATION
. OF AN EFFECT STANDARD
Most court decisions applying the discriminatory effect standard have
involved 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act, a key provision of
the statute under which it is unlawful: (1) to refuse to sell or rent after a
bona fide offer is made; (2) to refuse to negotiate for sale or rental; or (3)
to otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. When the alleged discrimi-
natory conduct is not easily characterized as either a refusal to deal or to
negotiate, plaintiffs have relied on the general provision, "to otherwise
make unavailable or deny." This "omnibus provision" prohibits racial
steering, redlining and exclusionary zoning practices.5" The basic sub-
section (a) prohibits "grudging" or passive acceptance of nonwhites as
contrasted with enthusiastic service to whites;5' solicitation of potential
buyers in white areas but not in black areas;52 racially discriminatory
appraisal of dwellings;53 landlord interference with interracial associa-
tions;54 and the deliberate maintenance of an all-white, discriminatory
image.55
While the most elaborate analysis of plaintiffs' prima facie case based
on discriminatory effect is seen in lawsuits challenging local government
exclusionary practices or other action affecting a large number of peo-
ple,5 6 the effect standard has also been upheld in suits brought to redress
discrimination victimizing plaintiffs in private transactions. For in-
stance, in Smith v. Anchor Building Corp.57 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that a prima facie inference of discrimination arises as a
matter of law where (1) a black rental applicant meets the objective re-
quirements of a landlord, and (2) the rental would likely have been con-
summated were he or she a white applicant. If this inference is not
satisfactorily explained by the defendant, discrimination is established
and plaintiff prevails. 8
50. See Calmore, supra note 32, at 612.
51. United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973).
52. United States v. Treasure Lakes, Inc., EQUAL Hous. Opp. REP. (P-H) 13,600 (W.D. PA.
1973).
53. United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill.
1977).
54. Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982).
55. United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
56. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974); Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (Arlington Heights
II); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
57. 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976).
58. Id. at 233.
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A. Griggs v. Duke Power: The Employment Discrimination Analysis
and Analogy to Housing Discrimination
The Supreme Court has not ruled explicitly on whether title VIII per-
mits an effect standard of proof. It has, however, ruled that such a stan-
dard is permitted under title VII, the employment statutory analogue to
title VIII. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,59 decided in 1971, the Court
interpreted "because of race" and unanimously established the principle
that a facially neutral job selection criterion which is unrelated to mea-
suring job capacity cannot be utilized by the employer when the selection
practice or policy has a "disparate impact," excluding blacks at a sub-
stantially higher rate than whites even if the selection criteria were estab-
lished without any discriminatory intent.6"
At the crux of proving racial discrimination in this context is the pres-
entation of percentage differentials that are sufficiently substantial to in-
fer bias. The disparate impact prima facie case raises a presumption that
a substantial statistical disparity could only arise as a result of actual
discrimination. Borrowing from employment law, the courts have char-
acterized three kinds of statistical analysis available to plaintiffs for use in
showing a significant disparity. "Applicant flow statistics" compare the
percentage of actual or potential black applicants who have been disqual-
ified by a landlord's selection policy with the percentage of their white
counterparts who have been similarly disqualified. The conclusion here
could evidence "disproportionate impact." "Relevant tenant pool" statis-
tics compare the percentage of blacks in the geographic area's pool of
qualified tenants. Finally, "population statistics" compare the percent-
age of blacks in the landlord's tenant body with the percentage of blacks
in the general population of the geographic area. These second and third
statistical comparisons can evidence nonwhite underrepresentation as a
form of "discriminatory effect."6 1 The Griggs rule has correctly been ra-
tionalized in terms of the improbability of alternative, nondiscriminatory
explanations.62 Thus, under Griggs "the inequality itself raises an infer-
ence that a specific discriminatory process is functioning to cause the
observed disparity.
'63
As an illustration, consider United States v. Real Estate Development
59. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
60. Id. at 432 where the Court declared, "Good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability .... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation" (emphasis in original). The Act is
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See generally, Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie
Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 138 (1976).
61. Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof
and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387, 393 (1975).
62. Id. at 391-92.
63. Note, Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case Under Title VII. Limiting Judicial Review of
10
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Corp. 64 where a prima facie case of housing discrimination was estab-
lished by facts showing that (1) blacks lived within a four-or-five block
radius of defendant's apartments; (2) the city where the apartments were
located had a population including thirty-seven point six percent blacks;
(3) over a six-year period none of defendant's apartments had ever been
rented to blacks even though a number of them had applied to rent units
in the apartments.65
The probative value of this statistical evidence was reinforced by the
landlord's failure to apply objective criteria similarly to all rental appli-
cants. This indicated to the court that race was the only identifiable fac-
tor that could explain the lack of black tenants. Finally, the court
dismissed the possibility that the absence of black tenants, under the cir-
cumstances, was an indication of their lack of interest. Instead, as
viewed by the court, it indicated "a sense of the futility of such an effort
in the face of the notorious discriminatory policy" of the landlord.66
Under the facts described above, it is difficult to imagine principled ob-
jection to the court's finding of discrimination even in the absence of any
proof of illicit motive or intent.67
B. Title VIII Proof Standards: A Comparison Between a Factors
Analysis And a Prima Facie Case Analysis
In 1977 the Supreme Court decided Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ,68 popularly known as Arling-
ton Heights I. The Court followed its decision in Washington v. Davis
69
and held that even though the "ultimate effect" of a town's zoning deci-
sion might be racially discriminatory this was inadequate to establish a
Less Restrictive Alternatives, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 190-91; see also Note, Employment Testing:
The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 900, 910 (1972).
64. 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
65. Id. at 779.
66. Id.
67. See generally Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an Employment Discrimina-
tion Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563 (1986)
68. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
69. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). In Washington v. Davis the Supreme Court held that under the
equal protection clause the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule... that
racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the
weightiest of considerations.
See also Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in
Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 990; Comment, Proof of Racially Discrimina-
tory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt.
Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725, 738-39 (1977); Note, Discriminatory
Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1397-
98 (1979).
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constitutional equal protection claim in the absence of discriminatory
purpose. The Court, however, remanded the case for a consideration of
whether the effect standard should apply to title VIII.7°
Establishing a title VIII violation on the basis of discriminatory effect
is approached differently in two principal ways: (1) focusing on critical
factors as articulated in Arlington Heights II,71 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals remand decision or (2) applying the prima facie concept as
articulated in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision of Resident
Advisory Board v. Rizzo.72 Both decisions were decided within months of
each other in 1977 and their approaches, separately or in combination,
have been followed in subsequent federal decisions at both the trial court
and appellate levels. While these later decisions have elaborated on the
approaches and illustrated the varying factual contexts in which they ap-
ply, the conceptual framework of Arlington Heights II and Rizzo remain
largely unqualified.
While the Seventh Circuit's Arlington Heights II decision held that at
least under some circumstances a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) can be
established by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of
discriminatory intent, the court refused to conclude that every action
which produced discriminatory effect is illegal. The court advised that
the courts must use their discretion in determining whether, in light of
the particular circumstances of each case, relief should be granted under
title VIII.
73
Rejecting the Griggs method of having the evidence of discriminatory
effect shift the burden of justification to the defendant village, the court
utilized "four critical factors" to be considered in deciding whether dis-
criminatory impact would establish a title VIII violation. Those factors
are: (1) the strength of plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2)
the presence of evidence of-discriminatory intent; though not enough to
satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis; (3) the defend-
ant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) whether plaintiff
seeks to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for mem-
bers of minority groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfer-
ing with individual property owners who wish to provide such housing.74
The court identified two kinds of discriminatory effect: (1) when a deci-
sion or conduct causes a greater "adverse impact" on blacks than on
whites, or (2) when a decision or conduct "perpetuates segregation"
thereby blocking interracial association. Note that the court considered
the second effect as invidious under title VIII regardless of the extent to
70. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
71. Arlington Heights I1, 558 F.2d at.1290.
72. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
73. Arlington Heights 11, 558 F.2d at 1290.
74. Id.
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which it might cause a disparate effect on blacks.75
The Rizzo litigation arose out of the city of Philadelphia's attempts to
prevent construction of a public housing project in a nearly all-white area
of the city. The trial court ruled that because ninety-five percent of those
on the housing's waiting list were nonwhite, the failure to build such
housing had a discriminatory effect on nonwhites.76 In affirming that a
showing of discriminatory effect alone will establish a title VIII prima
facie case, the Third Circuit set forth the following standard for deter-
mining whether the defendant has carried its burden of justification for
the acts resulting in the discriminatory effect: "A justification must
serve, in theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title
VIII defendant, and must show that no alternative course of action could
be adopted that would enable that interest to be served with less discrimi-
natory impact."77 The court explained that should defendant introduce
evidence that no less discriminatory alternative course existed, then the
burden would shift back to plaintiff to demonstrate that such a course
was available.78
In concluding that the Rizzo approach is preferable to that of Arlington
Heights, Professor Schwemm has observed that the Seventh Circuit deci-
sion fails to explain how the relevant factors are to be weighed, "and it
thus fails to provide adequate guidance to the trial judges, litigants, and
future decision makers .who will have to apply it. The proper structure
for balancing these factors and for identifying where the burden of proof
lies has already been established under title VII by Griggs and its prog-
eny. Rizzo wisely decided to follow this lead."79
Recently, in the significant case of Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates,80
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit elaborated on the Rizzo ap-
proach, applying it in the context of a suit not brought against a local
government exclusionary practice but, rather, in the context of a private
landlord-tenant transaction. Plaintiffs challenged the apartment owners'
75. Id.
76. 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
77. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149 n.37; see also United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (same standard applied to a segregative effect case).
78. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149 n.37.
79. Schwemm, supra note 2, at 257-58.
80. 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984). This case is significant not only as a Fourth Circuit contrast
to the state court decision in Weaver, but also because
Betsey is the first circuit court case to directly apply the Title VII prima facie case doctrine
using disparate impact analysis in the case of a private nongovernmental defendant charged
with housing discrimination. Betsey is particularly noteworthy because it clarifies the standard
of proof to be applied in housing discrimination cases involving private defendants. Betsey is the
first circut court case to expressly find a prima facie case of racially disparate impact as a result
of an all-adult housing policy. Landlords and policymakers must carefully consider the far-
reaching implications of Betsey when formulating or administering housing policy.
McGuinness, Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates: All-Adult Housing Policy May Violate the Fair
Housing Act, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 47, 50-51 (1985); see also Note, supra note 67, at 580.
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decision to convert one of their buildings from one which housed families
with children to one for adults only. In order to institute the all-adult
rental policy, the owners issued eviction notices to the plaintiff families
with children. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, claiming that defend-
ants acted with a racially discriminatory intent in seeking to evict them
and that the evictions would have a disparate impact, both constituting a
violation of title VIII.8"
At trial, the district court ruled discriminatory intent was established
but that the defendant had rebutted this evidence by proving that they
were motivated by economic considerations and not race.82 The trial
court further ruled that plaintiffs had failed to prove a prima facie case of
disparate racial impact and, therefore, entered judgment for defendant on
all claims.83 Plaintiffs appealed the discriminatory effect ruling.
The trial court had rejected "clear proof of discriminatory impact"
because (1) there was no continuing disproportionate impact; (2) there
was a high percentage of blacks in the overall complex of other buildings;
and (3) the policy on blacks residing in the local community was insignif-
icant.8 4 But the court of appeals found these three factors irrelevant to a
prima facie showing of racially discriminatory impact. The court held
that a discriminatory impact case under title VIII is established if plain-
tiffs, members of a discrete minority, prove only that a given policy had a
discriminatory impact on them as individuals.8 5 The plain language of
the statute makes it unlawful "to discriminate against any person.'"6 Ac-
cording to the court:
The correct inquiry is whether the policy in question had a dispropor-
tionate impact on the minorities in the total group to which the policy
was applied. In this case, the all-adult conversion policy was applied to
the residents in Building Three. "Bottom line" considerations of the
number and percentage of minorities in the rest of the complex or the
community are "of little comfort" to those minority families evicted from
Building Three.87
In addressing the defendants' justification burden, the court stated that
defendants would have to show more than mere economic considerations
that is, when a discriminatory effect is involved the owners had to do
more than merely articulate some "legitimate non-discriminatory im-
pact." Instead, "defendants must prove a business necessity sufficiently
compelling to justify the challenged practice."
88
81. Betsey, 736 F.2d at 985.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 987.
85. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1982)).
86. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1982)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 988.
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VI. THE EFFECT STANDARD IS WORKABLE AND FAIR
The discriminatory effect standard is not only judicially manageable,
but it also provides clear guidance for fair housing lawyers and claim-
ants. 9 Moreover, most fair housing cases involving private transactions
have turned on whether there was purposeful discrimination and not dis-
criminatory effect.9° Furthermore, even in those cases finding disparate
impact, there was usually also evidence of intentional disparate treat-
ment, and this is true in both private transaction cases and those involv-
ing discrimination resulting from land use and other exclusionary
practices by municipal governments.9
In the disparate treatment case, the defendant's burden is relatively
light in rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie case. Defendant simply must
demonstrate that there were reasons other than plaintiff's race underly-
ing the refusal to deal with plaintiff and these countervailing justifications
will usually relate to the shelter seeker's applicant characteristics.92
As suggested in Bush v. Kaim,93 some of the factors to consider in
determining whether defendant's reasons for not accepting a shelter
seeker were racially motivated or not include: (1) whether the owner
requested information regarding these subjects from plaintiff; (2) whether
the owner requested this information from other applicants; (3) whether
he obtained this information from other sources; (4) whether he sought
this information from the plaintiff and/or other applicants over the time
in which he was selecting a tenant; (5) whether the owner attempted to
follow up on this information or to validate its accuracy; (6) whether he
performed this follow-up or validation process during the time in which
he was deciding on whom to select; and (7) whether other applicants
existed with better or more desirable ratings.9 4 Often a negative answer
to any of these questions will support plaintiff's burden of showing
pretext. 95
Hence, in evaluating discrimination involving an applicant's character-
istics, it is important to scrutinize the circumstances under which the
denial was made, by considering such factors as (1) whether normal pro-
89. Calmore, supra note 2, at 86.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Betsey, 736 F.2d at 985. Moreover, as stated by Professor Schwemm:
A landlord is certainly free under Title VIII to pick a white applicant over a black applicant if
his sole reason for doing so is that the white applicant is better qualified on the basis of legiti-
mate rental criteria... On the other hand, if the evidence shows that the defendant did not rely
on these nonracial reasons (e.g., the new white tenant is actually less qualified than the plaintiff),
then the plaintiff is likely to prevail, because it now appears that the actual and only reason for
the defendant's refusal was the plaintiff's race.
R. SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 54.
93. 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
94. Id. at 162.
95. See Calmore, supra note 32, at 633.
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cedures were followed in checking applicant's background; (2) whether
normal criteria were applied equally to similarly situated blacks and
whites; (3) whether defendant's subjective criteria were colored by racial
prejudice or stereotype; and (4) whether objective selection criteria were
reasonable measures of an applicant's suitability as a tenant or buyer.
96
Generalizing about the evaluation of the legitimacy of a defendant's
excuse based on applicant characteristics is difficult because there is such
a variety of reasons upon which a defendant may rely and because the
issue is primarily one of the defendant's credibility under quite varied
circumstances. Reasons offered unsuccessfully by defendants include
that plaintiffs were unmarried persons, single women, divorced men, mil-
itary personnel below the rank of major, noncitizens with diplomatic im-
munity, students, without children or with too many children, too young,
or had failed to follow proper application procedure, became angry or
"uppity" when applying, misrepresented employment history, failed to
demonstrate ability to meet necessary financial obligations. 97
Many who want to impose intent as the only standard of proof simply
fail to consider that in most cases it is already the predominant standard
and any legitimate reasons for the challenged conduct will defeat the
housing discrimination claim. These critics fail further to recognize that
discrimination in present day America is often subtle and so "artfully
cloaked and concealed in sophisticated language that its true nature does
not become obvious."98
CONCLUSION
Permitting liability in cases of discriminatory effect recognizes two pol-
icy judgments. First, in many cases requiring proof of subjective intent is
so difficult that to require it would defeat the purpose of fair housing
legislation. Second, non-intentional discrimination can be as invidious
and as damaging as intentional discrimination. 99 For these reasons, effect
and not intent must remain the proper touchstone for proving housing
discrimination." ° The state of North Carolina appellate decision in
96. Id. at 634; see also Note, supra note 67, at 584.
97. See sources cited in Calmore, supra note 32, at 634.
98. Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1972); see generally Lawrence,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987).
99. Note, supra note 67, at 567.
100. As one commentator states:
Segregation in shelter results largely from intentional discrimination. Empirical evidence per-
suasively suggests that resi- dential segregation is not exclusively attributable to black poverty
or inability to pay for housing. It is also clear, however, that racially neutral practices of business
and governmental actors in the housing sphere disproportionately limit the housing opportunities
of members of protected groups. Liability based on disparate impact and business necessity anal-
ysis are appropriate tools for achieving the goals of Title VIII.
Id. at 578-79 (emphasis added).
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Weaver should be overcome by state legislation amending the fair hous-
ing act and clearly providing that (1) a violation of the state fair housing
act may be established upon the basis of discriminatory effect and (2)
that race (color, religion, national origin, or sex) is an impermissible fac-
tor in a discriminating decision not to engage in a real estate transaction
even if it is not the sole reason or total factor in that decision. If the
legislature was originally motivated in passing the state fair housing act
to fully address invidious discrimination it must act forthwith to set right
the state court's decision in Weaver derailing that attempt.''
101. See Duncan, Hood & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay.
Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB. LAW. 510, 530 (1975):
This [disparate impact liability] rationale seems particularly appropriate to Title VIII since its
stated purpose of providing fair housing within the United States clearly would be unobtainable
unless the Act were construed to prohibit not only open, direct discrimination, but also those
practices which have the effect of discriminating along racial lines.
The state legislature should follow the lead of Congress in an analagous case. In 1980, the
Supreme Court held that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did not permit judicial relief in vote
dilution instances, such as at-large elections, in the absence of proof that the alleged discrimination
was intentional. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). In 1982, however, Congress ap-
proved amendments providing that violations of § 2 can be established without proving discrimina-
tory intent. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982)). The Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary points out:
In Bolden, a plurality of the Supreme Court broke with precedent and substantially increased
the burden on plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases by requiring proof of discriminatory pur-
pose. The Committee has concluded that this intent test places an unacceptably difficult burden
on plaintiffs. It diverts the judicial inquiry from the crucial question of whether minorities have
equal access to the electoral process to a historical question of individual motives.
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
177, 193; see also McKenzie & Krauss, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: An Analysis of the 1982
Amendment, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155 (1984); Comment, Vote Dilution, Discriminatory
Results, and Proportional Respresentation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a Violation of Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1203 (1985).
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